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Watergate is an event that influenced a generation and their beliefs in 
American government. Likewise, rhetorical scholars have been fascinated with 
the scandal, spending considerable energy addressing the issue from multiple 
perspectives. These analyses have examined the apologia of Nixon (Harrell, 
Ware, and Linkugel; King), his resignation (Rosenfeld; Wilson), the general 
course of events that contributed to the cover up (Gouran; Schuetz), and the af-
termath of the scandal (Blair; Klumpp and Lukehart). Noticeably absent, how-
ever, is a detailed analysis of the rhetoric that most influenced the trajectory of 
the crisis—the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon. A ruling rife 
with social and legal implications, it has influenced political decision making for 
nearly thirty years. Immediately, it prompted the first resignation of a President 
of the United States. In terms of legal repercussions, it has been suggested that 
the decision “will probably become one of the most important expansions of 
judicial authority in the history of the Republic” (Westin xxi). 
Maintaining Institutional Power 
and Constitutional Principles: 
A Rhetorical Analysis of United States v. Nixon 
R. Scott Medsker and Todd F. McDorman 
While president, Richard Milhouse Nixon was almost obsessive in his de-
sire to control the flow of information. One example of Nixon’s pre-occupation 
is demonstrated in the lengths he went to identify who was leaking national se-
curity information contained in the Pentagon Papers. Angered by FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover’s refusal to investigate the source of these leaks, Nixon created a 
group to do the task himself (Kutler 112). These henchmen, known as “the 
Plumbers,” were subsequently used by Nixon to spy on both his own administra-
tion and his opponents in the Democratic Party; and whether one deems it fitting 
or ironic, eventually contributed to his loss of the presidency.  
In examining these implications we argue that the Court’s Nixon decision 
was a uniquely strategic response to a complex rhetorical situation. In fact, the 
elements of the situation were so fundamental to the tenor of the Court’s re-
sponse that this essay’s framework is drawn from Lloyd F. Bitzer’s construction 
of the rhetorical situation. The use of this system will allow for deeper consid-
eration of the context of United States v. Nixon as well as assessment of the 
legal text as responsive to that context.  
On June 17, 1972, seven Nixon neophytes broke into the Democratic Na-
tional Headquarters in the Watergate complex to wiretap phones and obtain 
campaign information. While the seven men were arrested and eventually con-
victed for their crime, who orchestrated the break-in remained a mystery, al-
though some quickly suggested that the orders came from within the White 
House (Apple 1). In January 1973, after the general election, enough concern 
remained to justify the formation of a Congressional committee to investigate 
allegations of White House misconduct. However, the initial witness testimony, 
which was identical from all involved, failed to implicate President Nixon or his 
administration. 
The analysis reveals that in resolving the case the Court was faced with 
concerns on two fronts. First, on an institutional front, the Court sought to main-
tain their ability to perform their duties against encroaching claims from the 
executive branch. Simultaneously, the Court worked to balance the sacred doc-
trine of American jurisprudence that “no man is above the law” with the status 
of the President as “first among equals.” Utilizing Bitzer’s rhetorical situation 
we examine how the Court responded to the constraints, exigencies, and audi-
ences present in this extraordinary situation, ultimately arguing that the Court 
skillfully assessed a complex situation and offered a rhetorical response that not 
only maintained their institutional power in a tenuous time but also preserved 
the basic tenets of American judicial theory. 
During the third week of March, two members of Nixon’s team broke rank 
and gave critical information that did in fact implicate the president. On March 
19, James McCord, a former Nixon security advisor and one of the convicted 
Watergate burglars, wrote to Judge Sirca, who presided over his trial, and in-
formed Sirca that White House officials had worked to keep the seven intruders 
silent. On March 22, FBI Director Patrick Gray further fueled speculation by 
telling a Senate committee that White House counsel had “probably lied” during 
the investigation. Subsequently, on March 26, 1973 the Watergate grand jury 
convened for the first time (Apple 2-3).  
The Rhetorical Situation as an Approach to Legal Rhetoric 
Perhaps in response to Lucaites’ challenge to rhetorical scholars, attention 
to the rhetorical dimensions of legal decision-making has grown in recent years. 
In the past decade scholars of legal rhetoric, possessing varied goals, have of-
fered important observations about the intermingling of law and society (Hasian; 
Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites; Sullivan and Goldzwig; Rountree). In bringing 
social considerations to the reading of judicial opinions such work has rein-
forced Prentice’s claim that “judicial rhetoric is a form of argument that seeks to 
persuade listeners of the legitimacy of particular uses of power” (87). For in-
stance, Critical Legal Studies scholars have addressed contradictions and deep-
level incoherence within texts that legitimize unjust systems of power and dis-
tribution of wealth. One investigation in this tradition undertaken by Hasian 
examined the functions of law as sword, shield, and menace within Buck v. Bell 
As the investigation proceeded, a Special Prosecutor was appointed. He was 
granted sweeping power and charged to “investigate, subpoena, [and] bring suit 
in court against anyone suspected of criminal wrongdoing in the campaign of 
1972, up to and through the White House to the President himself” (White 250). 
The Special Prosecutor subsequently asked the District Court to issue a sub-
poena duces tecum1 to compel President Nixon to supply critical information. 
Nixon’s resistance to the subpoena eventually brought United States v. Nixon 
before the Supreme Court—and provides the starting point for this analysis. 
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gence” (Prentice 98). While traditional legal constraints such as the Constitution, 
a lack of fiat while needing to compel compliance, and American ideology are 
relevant to United States v. Nixon, unique claims concerning jurisdiction and 
justiciability present special obstacles in the controversy. In issuing its judgment 
the Court must, to the best of its ability, circumvent, consider, or preferably util-
ize these constraints to create the most effective opinion possible (Prentice 98).  
and the eugenics controversy. Others, such as Rountree’s pentadic analysis of 
Korematsu v. United States, have sought to understand the relationships of ac-
tors, actions, and motives in the expression of judicial rhetorical power. Finally, 
numerous scholars have explored the moral implications of ideologically 
charged decisions (Srader; Sullivan and Goldzwig). Regardless of the approach 
used, it is clear that in briefs, oral arguments, and judicial opinions rhetorical 
expressions of power are central to understanding the meaning and implications 
of law.  
The use of the rhetorical situation as an approach to legal rhetoric has been 
explored previously by Robert Prentice in the Arizona Law Review. For his 
analysis Prentice selected Brown v. Board of Education because “more is known 
about the decision-making process in Brown than in any other case” (102). In 
Brown, the inflammatory nature of the issues forced the Court to realize that the 
manner in which they presented their “ruling would be no less important than 
the substantive content of the opinion” (Prentice 103). The result of Prentice’s 
investigation is a quality analysis by a legal scholar that at times underestimates 
the importance or impact of rhetorical subtleties. In contrast, in this analysis 
rhetorical scholars address a legal controversy in hopes of providing a more nu-
anced treatment of rhetoric (while no doubt opening ourselves up to similar 
charges concerning legal subtleties). While the subject matter of the analyses is 
vastly different, the resolution of a sensitive subject with a high probability of 
provoking disobedience represents a parallel between Brown and Nixon. Thus 
for this and similar reasons this essay employs the rhetorical situation to exam-
ine United States v. Nixon. 
One approach for reading rhetorical dimensions of the law that has received 
little attention is Bitzer’s conception of the rhetorical situation. While the idea is 
often dismissed as a pre-critical descriptive tool, Bitzer’s concept has a cozy fit 
with the operation of the law. For instance, Bitzer argues that the function of 
rhetoric is “ultimately to produce action or change in the world” (250). Such a 
function is nearly identical to that of the law in its efforts to control, regulate, or 
promote certain actions and behaviors. In this sense, Bitzer’s treatment of rheto-
ric within the rhetorical situation could be used to provide perspective on the 
workings of any Court ruling. However, other approaches to judicial rhetoric 
will often provide more nuanced analyses due to unique factors found in each 
decision.  
Still, the mapping of the rhetorical situation in terms of exigence, audience, 
and constraints is also an accurate mapping of the judicial decision making 
process from the acceptance of a case for oral argument to the rendering of an 
opinion. Bitzer defines exigence as “an imperfection marked by urgency . . . a 
defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it 
should be” (252). Some type of exigence or “something waiting to be done” 
marks every Supreme Court case and each judicial decision is written in re-
sponse to a specific obstacle, defect, or situation that is not as one party feels it 
should be (Prentice 94). Bitzer’s point that every rhetorical utterance is con-
trolled by situational factors such as an exigence mirrors the petitioners’ presen-
tation of a legal claim. In United States v. Nixon the exigencies include both a 
need to fulfill a subpoena and a threat to the Court’s status. 
The analysis proceeds by exploring with additional detail how the rhetorical 
situation can be an effective tool to evaluate strategic decisions in the legal 
sphere. That is rather than serving only a descriptive or pre-critical function, 
evaluation of complex situations can be fundamental to successful legal decision 
making, as the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon demon-
strates. 
Negotiating the Constraints: 
Determining Jurisdiction and Justiciability  
in United States v. Nixon Attention to audience is required according to Bitzer because “rhetorical 
discourse produces change by influencing the decision and action of persons 
who function as mediators of change” (253). The practice of this principle might 
be observed in the opinions written by Supreme Court justices who must con-
sider a number of separate and distinct constituencies, interests, and reactions 
(Prentice 95). These groups, to note only a few, may include the public, the liti-
gants, or the other justices. What makes United States v. Nixon unique and gives 
special emphasis to audience is that the key constituency is the most powerful 
person in the political hierarchy—the president. Thus rather than a generic con-
cern for audience, this controversy presents a particularized audience that makes 
the lens of the rhetorical situation particularly profound. 
In any given legal dispute there are likely to be numerous constraints oper-
ating in conflict with one another. Most importantly, each constraint has “the 
power to constrain decision and action needed” to address an exigence before 
the Supreme Court (Bitzer 254). These constraints may consist of social norms, 
statutes, criminal law, past precedent, or the Constitution. While constraints such 
as past precedent, the Constitution, and institutional rules are typical in nearly 
every case, in United States v. Nixon the Court effectively juggled more difficult 
challenges to their jurisdiction and the justiciability of the issue. These con-
straints initially presented barriers to the Court’s ability to review the issue and 
thereby resolve the exigence. 
Before addressing the legal merit of claims proffered by Nixon and the Spe-
cial Prosecutor, the Supreme Court had to first determine if it had jurisdiction 
over the case. In most respects this is a fairly generic constraint. In every case, 
whether it is a criminal case in a District Court or a case of national importance 
The final element of the rhetorical situation concerns the relevant con-
straints. In a judicial context, the constraints consist of “persons, events, objects, 
and relations” that the Court must consider when writing an opinion because 
“they have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify exi-
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 41 (2004) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
2
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol41/iss1/2
 6 Speaker & Gavel 2004 
Speaker and Gavel, Vol 41 (2004) www.dsr-tka.org/ 
Speaker & Gavel 2004 5
to both Nixon and the office of the presidency in order to navigate what could 
have been a barrier to resolving the exigence. in the Supreme Court, the question of whether the implicated court has authority to adjudicate the controversy must be decided. In Nixon, the Court acknowl-
edged the a priori nature of this issue by calling it the “threshold question” (690) 
in the case.  
The second key constraint for the Court was the question of justiciability. In 
order for the Court to hear a case it must present a resolvable issue that is not a 
strictly political question (Baker v. Carr). If the issue was an intra-branch dis-
pute, as Nixon’s counselors contended, the Court would have no authority to 
intervene. Just as they did in addressing the question of jurisdiction, the Court 
carefully chose its words so as to not offend the President, even going so far as 
to suggest that the Executive Branch could have avoided the legal controversy. 
While jurisdiction is a requirement for any court to hear a legal controversy, 
additional explanation allows full appreciation of the complicated nature of this 
question and the challenge it presented. In appellate courts, such as the Court of 
Appeals or the Supreme Court, one rarely sees argument over specific motions 
but instead entire decisions are appealed from lower courts. This is because in 
order to create a judiciary that is efficient as well as to avoid piecemeal reviews 
of cases, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals encompasses only the “final 
decisions of the district courts” (United States v. Nixon 690), thus typically ex-
cluding motions such as the subpoena duces tecum around which this case re-
volved. 
Arguing in the Court of Appeals, Nixon’s attorneys contended the matter 
was an intra-branch dispute between the President and the Special Prosecutor, 
who serves as an extension of the Department of Justice, a section of the Execu-
tive Branch, therefore leaving the Court without jurisdiction. After this argument 
was rejected by the Court of Appeals it was renewed before the Supreme Court 
in an alternative form, with Nixon’s attorneys arguing that the political nature of 
the matter was beyond the purview of the Court and hence not justiciable. To 
put it differently, since the chain of command flows through the Executive 
Branch from President to Attorney General to Special Prosecutor, Nixon’s coun-
selors argued that the Court could not tell the President how to manage his 
branch, effectively barring the Court from providing any relief to the exigence. 
At first glance, therefore, jurisdiction appeared to present a constraint on the 
Supreme Court’s ability to review and resolve United States v. Nixon. If the 
Court could not hear the case, they obviously could not hand down a decision. 
On the other hand, by claiming jurisdiction, it was possible that the Court would 
appear overly eager to settle the issue. To navigate the tension, the Court turned 
to the precedent set by prior cases. Specifically, the Court reasoned that Nixon 
fell within an exception to the “finality” requirement. Utilizing United States v. 
Ryan, the Court concluded that the case was properly appealable because it met 
the conditions of a “limited class of cases where denial of immediate review 
would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual’s claim” (Ryan 
533; Nixon 691). With the case properly “in” the Court of Appeals, the case was 
also properly before the Supreme Court. Wisely, the Court realized that citing 
past precedent could not only establish jurisdiction, but also create the sense that 
the Court was obligated—that they had no choice—except to resolve the contro-
versy. This allowed review of the matter while at the same time avoiding the 
appearance of a Court eager to delve into matters of the Executive Branch.  
To refute this claim and negotiate their way around the barrier of justiciabil-
ity, the Court relied upon the Constitution and sections of U.S. Code which de-
fine the ability of the Attorney General to appoint subordinate officers to dis-
charge relevant duties. The Court explains: 
Acting pursuant to those statutes, the Attorney General has delegated the 
authority to represent the United States in these particular matters to a Special 
Prosecutor with unique authority and tenure. The regulation gives the Special 
Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the 
process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these spe-
cially delegated duties. (United States v. Nixon 694-95) 
Here the Court explained that while it is true that the Special Prosecutor is 
an agent of the Executive Branch, his duties allow him to turn to the Judicial 
Branch for aid should he be hindered in gathering the evidence needed to com-
plete his function.  
In explaining its reasoning the Court was also careful to pay deference to 
the high office Nixon held. For instance, in referencing Ryan’s determination 
that to risk contempt for defying a court’s order is not an undue burden for the 
ordinary citizen, the Court acknowledged the special standing of the president. 
Preserving the maxim that the president is the “first among equals,” the Court 
used precedent to demonstrate their desire to prevent an “unnecessary occasion 
for constitutional confrontation between two branches of government” (United 
States v. Nixon 692) by requiring Nixon to “place himself in the posture of dis-
obeying an order of a court simply to trigger the procedural mechanism for re-
view” (691). Such a result would not only be “unseemly” but “the issue [of] 
whether a President can be cited for contempt could itself engender protracted 
litigation, and would further delay both review . . . and the ultimate termination” 
of the controversy (691-92). By delicately crafting an opinion that created a 
clear attempt to present the image of facilitating the needs of the President, the 
Court maneuvered to combine the power of precedent with calculated deference 
While this passage is certainly important as it validated the actions of the 
Special Prosecutor, footnote 8 registered the fatal blow to Nixon’s argument. In 
that footnote the Court cited federal register rules defining the power of the Spe-
cial Prosecutor, which was given full authority “to contest the assertion of ‘Ex-
ecutive Privilege.’” Moreover, the footnote explained the existence of “assur-
ances given by the President to the Attorney General that the President will not 
exercise his Constitutional powers . . . to limit the independence that he [the 
Special Prosecutor] is hereby given” (United States v. Nixon 694-95). The foot-
note removes any ambiguity that might exist in the text of the opinion. The 
question of justiciability is resolved—the Special Prosecutor has the right to turn 
to the Judicial Branch for help in completing his task. To include this footnote in 
the body of the text, in plain sight if you will, might have been perceived as 
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From the very beginning of the opinion, the Court had to skillfully navigate 
the constraints, namely jurisdiction and justiciability, to put itself in a position to 
consider the exigence. To do so, the Court used language that was concrete and 
left little room for interpretation while saving Nixon from an embarrassing blow 
to his reputation. Further, the Court cited binding federal regulations, binding 
precedent, and the actions of the Executive and Legislative branch to help nul-
lify imminent criticism that they were practicing judicial statecraft. With the 
constraints eliminated the Court turned its collective mind towards the exigen-
cies of the controversy.  
charging that either Nixon’s counsel was so incompetent in their briefs that they 
did not know of this assurance or that they knowingly presenting the Court false 
information. Regardless of which was true, either would be an insult and an em-
barrassment to the President, making him hostile to any decision from the Court. 
Given that the condition was too important to omit the Court wisely placed it in 
the footnote, thus preserving the record while also allowing the President to 
keep his dignity. 
Perhaps most importantly, in an attempt to again show that they are not 
zealous to encroach on the Executive Branch, the Court noted that it was “theo-
retically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the regulation 
defining the Special Prosecutor’s authority. But he has not done so” (United 
States v. Nixon 696). The Court simultaneously reminds the reader that so long 
as the regulation delegating the Special Prosecutor “remains in force the Execu-
tive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign com-
posed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it” (696, emphasis 
added). By suggesting that the Executive could have avoided the problem if the 
Attorney General had amended the Special Prosecutor’s responsibilities, the 
Court not only displaced some of the responsibility for the decision, but also 
showed the executive branch that future better management of the Special 
Prosecutor might avoid similar situations.2 
Resolving the Exigence: 
Enforcing the Subpoena and Defining Executive Privilege 
In United States v. Nixon the Court was required to address profound ques-
tions about the American political system. More specifically, the Court ad-
dressed questions of institutional authority and the enforcement of long held 
constitutional principles in determining how to treat the serving of a subpoena 
duces tecum and the meaning and extent of executive privilege. This required 
the Court to judge whether a subpoena duces tecum has the power to compel 
presidential compliance, assess its own power to review and limit executive ac-
tion, and to confront Nixon’s claim of an absolute executive privilege. These 
issues emerged from the exigencies in the case, which, apart from the acts that 
instigated the general Watergate crisis, are two in number: (1) how a subpoena 
issued against the president should be evaluated and (2) the immense and imme-
diate threat to the Court’s ability to perform its constitutional duty by Nixon’s 
assertion of an absolute executive privilege. 
The Court concluded their answer to the question of justiciability with a ba-
sic judicial lesson on the meaning of the concept. Of course there was the “con-
troversy” or “conflict” over whether or not the Special Prosecutor could take his 
boss to court, but the Court writes “controversy means more than disagreement 
and conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve” 
(United States v. Nixon 696). The use of the word “traditionally” reasserts that 
what the Court did was nothing radical, but rather was the continuing function of 
their constitutional role. The Court quotes U.S. v. ICC, another benchmark in 
legal history, when they say “Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these 
issues are ‘of a type which are traditionally justiciable’” (430; United States v. 
Nixon 697). In doing so the Court declared that it is their role, as specified by 
precedent, to decide such conflicts.  
The special prosecutor charged with investigating the Watergate scandal is-
sued the subpoena to obtain certain tapes or documents relating to precisely 
identified conversations and meetings between the President and others involved 
in the indictment. President Nixon responded by claiming that executive privi-
lege protected the release of these documents and tapes and thus moved to quash 
the motion. The conflicting stances created an institutional imperfection—an 
exigence—that the Supreme Court sought to relieve. The case before the Court, 
an appeal of the District Court’s decision that had upheld the subpoena duces 
tecum, had to resolve the question of the power and validity of the subpoena in 
order to determine if the criminal case could proceed.  
Thus ultimately the Court effectively confronted issues related to its institu-
tional authority and American jurisprudence. In preserving the institutional au-
thority and power of the Court, they invoked their history and precedents and 
cited federal regulations and sections of U.S. Code to assert that their action in 
this case was not revolutionary. Without explicitly stating it, the Court created 
the perception that rather than encroaching upon the territory of the Executive 
Branch they were simply maintaining their institutional authority and power as 
granted by the Constitution. At the same time, in their effort to preserve Ameri-
can jurisprudence, the Court argued that to allow the subpoena to go unfulfilled 
“would be inconsistent with the applicable law and regulation” (United States v. 
Nixon 697). They understood that despite the unique facts of the case, precedent 
must be upheld because “no man is above the law,” not even the Chief Execu-
tive. 
In responding to this exigence the Court methodically addressed the possi-
ble reasons for quashing a subpoena duces tecum, as set out in Federal Rule of 
Criminal Proceedings 17 (c). They refuted each possible objection to the sub-
poena’s enforcement and explained why the reasons did not suffice in United 
States v. Nixon. First, “a subpoena for documents may be quashed if their pro-
duction would be ‘unreasonable or oppressive,’ but not otherwise” (698). As 
support, previous rulings in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States and United 
States v. Iozia were referenced to set out the tests that govern such situations. 
Second, it is noted that “the Special Prosecutor, in order to carry his burden, 
must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity” (700). 
With much of the prior record placed under seal, the Supreme Court strategi-
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Such concerns demanded that the Court not restrict the powers of executive 
privilege by too great of a magnitude. This concern is demonstrated in footnote 
twenty of United States v. Nixon where the Court suggested a parallel between 
the candor of a juror and the openness of a presidential advisor. The note states: 
cally defered to the District Court, explaining that their own review “necessarily 
affords a less comprehensive view of the total situation than was available to the 
trial judge” (700). Here the Court is careful rather than brash, a move that both 
bolstered the legitimacy of the subpoena and established limits to the Court’s 
power.  A juror (or advisor in our case) of integrity and reasonable firmness will not fear to speak his mind if the confidences of debate are barred to the ears of mere 
impertinence or malice. He will not expect to be shielded against the disclosure 
of his conduct in the event that there is evidence reflecting upon his honor. The 
chance that now and then there may be found some timid soul who will take 
counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive power is too remote and 
shadowy to shape the course of justice. (712)  
Moreover, as United States v. Nixon was not the first occasion the Court had 
to examine the power of a duces tecum subpoena in a case involving a president, 
the Court was able to rely upon past doctrine in evaluating the power of the sub-
poena. In United States v. Burr, which concerned a treason charge against for-
mer Vice President Aaron Burr, Thomas Jefferson offered excerpts of a docu-
ment that would guarantee Burr’s conviction. In resolving the validity of a sub-
poena duces tecum in that case the Court ruled that the president could not re-
lease only certain items as he wished, instead demanding that he provide the 
whole text, or nothing (McGurn 14). 
Thus while the Court considered the candor of advisors, concerns over can-
dor did not determine their final stance on executive privilege. After being 
weighed by the justices, the potential constraint posed by hampering the execu-
tive with a partial privilege was not deemed significant enough to outweigh the 
risks of an unfettered executive. In resolving Nixon, the Court references Burr a total of seven times in order to serve numerous functions. First, the decision is cited to demonstrate that the 
Court was meticulous in its review of the subpoena (702). Second, and more 
importantly, Burr is used to assert that it is the Court’s “right and indeed duty to 
resolve” the issue (707, 708). Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, United 
States v. Burr is the only case relied upon in the text of the final five pages of 
the decision. There it is used as a guide for the execution of the subpoena duces 
tecum since the Court had a case that was similar to United States v. Nixon in 
important respects. The parallel illustrates that not only was this issue justicia-
ble, but it was executed without incident in the past. Thus through the use of 
precedent the Court reaffirmed its authority, rather than the President’s, to de-
termine what information was pertinent and necessary in the proceedings 
(McGurn 16). With the legitimacy of the subpoena thoroughly addressed, the 
question posed by the first exigence was resolved. The manner of resolution, 
allowing the case to continue forward, forced the justices to address the second 
exigence—Nixon’s claim of an absolute executive privilege. 
The exigence of executive privilege required the Court to seek a precarious 
balance concerning how to afford sufficient protection to the President without 
creating an absolute privilege that risked placing the President beyond the law. 
In balancing these concerns the Court was able to consider the social atmosphere 
of the time and the public audience. With the support of the people in compel-
ling presidential compliance, the Court had more ability to uphold the “rule of 
law” and expand still further the discretionary power of the judiciary in the 
American constitutional system (Newport 1). That is, secure in the knowledge 
that the American public supported their efforts, the justices could be bold in 
projecting a broad sphere of influence. Public opinion at the time of United 
States v. Nixon was not only hospitable to a ruling against the President but was 
almost irresistibly pressing for it because of the president’s conduct in Water-
gate and the subsequent cover-up (Newport 1). Gallup Polls taken in August 
(“Watergate”) and October (“Watergate Tapes”) of 1973 showed respectively 
that 67% and 62% of Americans felt that Nixon was wrong to not volunteer the 
tapes to the District Court. Such support assisted the Supreme Court, in a time of 
public mistrust of the executive, in circumscribing the acceptable limits of ex-
ecutive privilege.  
Addressing the exigence of executive privilege presented a potentially ex-
plosive institutional battle between the executive and the judiciary and posed a 
threat to the Court’s status similar to that encountered in Brown v. Board of 
Education and Bush v. Gore. While the phrase “executive privilege” first ap-
peared in 1958 in an opinion by Justice Stanley F. Reed, presidents since George 
Washington, who denied the House of Representatives the right to see papers 
related to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty, have appealed to its existence (Bisk-
upic and Witt 217). However, United States v. Nixon is certainly the most im-
portant case regarding executive privilege and it was the first time the Court 
found a constitutional basis for it (Biskupic and Witt 219).  
The decision that the courts, and not the President, would define the scope 
of executive privilege was of central importance (Fisher 214). With the Con-
gress actively hostile to Nixon’s stance on executive privilege (Westin xx), the 
Court likely recognized that they could expand their power and Nixon would be 
left virtually helpless if he decided not to comply with the Court’s order. Staking 
a claim to this power, however, was an aggressive step for the Court, as they 
would—indirectly at a minimum—enhance their own power at the expense of 
the executive by limiting the scope of executive privilege. The gravity of this 
result clearly weighed upon the Court as throughout the opinion they took great 
pains to not only demonstrate that the Court had the authority to make this deci-
sion but also a duty to do so.  
To accept Nixon’s claim of a broad and absolute executive privilege would 
have barred the judiciary from carrying out its duties under the Constitution 
(Fisher 214) and it would have granted the Executive Branch a tool to hide 
nearly anything from the reaches of review. At the same time, the desire to pre-
vent an omnipotent chief executive was balanced by fears of hampering the Ex-
ecutive Branch too much and restricting the candor of advisors to the president. 
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ads in the newspaper, and we don’t want to go out on a picket line in our robes. 
We have to convince the nation by the force of our opinions” (qtd in Prentice 
86). Thus the wise justice (and the good rhetor) resorts to those arguments that 
are the most persuasive and, like speechwriters, utilizes emotional appeals, sym-
bolism, audience adaptation, and other persuasive techniques (Prentice 89). Es-
pecially when faced with a sitting president, who is charged with enforcing the 
laws, the Court is reminded of Andrew Jackson’s defiant attitude in response to 
a decision with which he disagreed: “John Marshall has made his decision; now 
let him enforce it” (qtd in Westin xx). 
In order to demonstrate this duty the Court called upon the seminal case in 
American legal history—Marbury v. Madison. The Court used Marbury to es-
tablish their credibility and authority, calling upon it to explain that “it is the 
duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’” (United States v. Nixon 703, 705, 
emphasis added). It is no accident that the Court used this touchstone of juris-
prudence, often considered the first meaningful case decided by the Supreme 
Court. And as if to reiterate the importance of this central point of Supreme 
Court history, the Court issued this statement not once, but twice.  
Ultimately the Court found a constitutional basis for the “protection of 
communications between high Government officials and those who advise and 
assist them in the performance of their manifold duties” (United States v. Nixon 
705). Reasoning that since “certain powers and privileges flow from the nature 
of enumerated powers,” the Court concluded that “the protection of confidential-
ity of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings” 
(705-06). To allow for the necessity of executive privilege, however, was not to 
allow the absolute privilege that Nixon asserted. The Court concluded that “to 
read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as 
against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than 
a generalized claim . . . would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workable 
government’ and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III” (United 
States v. Nixon 707). To disrupt this balance, a system of checks whereby each 
branch is interdependent with the others, would be to disturb the foundation of 
American government. Thus ultimately the Court effectively used the Constitu-
tion to not only affirm the existence of executive privilege but also to maintain 
their power under Article III. 
In crafting a rhetorically sensitive response, the justices preserved the his-
toric building blocks of American legal theory, skillfully navigating a fine line 
in protecting and pleasing a public who wanted the President held accountable 
while also guarding the dignity of the office of the president and preserving a 
president’s ability to perform his or her job. At the same time, the Court had to 
quell a threatening president, guaranteeing that he would comply with their rul-
ing while maintaining their own ability to function as a part of the national gov-
ernment. In addition to writing for the public and the President, members of the 
Court also had to consider the philosophical standing of their fellow justices to 
make a “definitive” ruling possible. Finally, the justices would attempt to write 
with sufficient clarity and specificity to guide lower courts and future justices.  
While in every Supreme Court case there is an audience which is “capable 
of being influenced” (Bitzer 253) by the Court’s discourse, this particular con-
troversy was largely unique in that the most important audience was a sitting 
president. President Nixon’s press spokesman Ron Ziegler had promised that the 
President would comply with a “definitive” ruling, but what would be consid-
ered “definitive” remained unclear (McGurn 13). Prior to oral arguments and the 
Court’s decision Nixon reportedly said, “I don’t give a shit what happens. I want 
you all to stonewall it. Let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up or any-
thing else that will save the plan. That’s the whole plan” (Westin xi). Nixon’s 
desire to not cooperate was a chilling reminder to the Court concerning the lim-
its of its powers and lack of enforcement mechanisms. Likewise, the threat 
showed Nixon’s frame of mind and lack of respect for the system of government 
he was charged to protect. It also presented the justices with a major con-
straint—the realization that they could not chastise the President so harshly that 
he would not comply. The ultimate result, from the perspective of Westin, was a 
judicial opinion that “sounds like the cool lecture on constitutional fundamentals 
that a rather pedantic school master might deliver to a pupil who has handed in a 
very poor paper on the constitutional fundamentals of the American system and 
deserved a lesson in basics” (xvii). 
The exigence—in terms of its legal dimensions—was resolved. The sub-
poena would be fulfilled. The Court would maintain its power by defining ex-
ecutive privilege as a broad, though not absolute, protection. Executive privilege 
would allow the president protection in matters regarding the military, diplo-
macy, and national security, while the Court maintained sufficient authority to 
fulfill its constitutional duty. The complexity of balancing the exigencies—
enforcing the subpoena while maintaining the power of the presidency—
contributed to the complex language the justices used in addressing the audi-
ences and dealing with constraints. While the constraints, as discussed, threat-
ened to hamper what the Court could and could not do, the audiences would 
ultimately determine the fate of the Court’s decision by either complying with or 
ignoring it. Nixon’s staff had noted that he would follow a “definitive” ruling 
from the Court, but what Nixon considered “definitive” was unclear (McGurn 
13). Unless the Court could deftly handle the executive office as an important 
audience, a dangerous conflict between the executive and the judiciary remained 
a possibility. 
At the same time the Court was careful to look past the actual person occu-
pying the office of the president, Nixon, and to the “presidency” itself. Any de-
cision the Court made would affect the office and the function of future leaders 
of the United States. Respect for the office is noted by the manner in which the 
Justices refer to the respondent—as “the President.” This is unique in that in 
most every other opinion the parties are referred to as “petitioner” and “respon-
dent,” not by name or title. The use of formal title illustrates that the Justices did 
Writing to Audience: 
Pacifying the President and the Public 
In commenting on the Supreme Court’s enforcement powers Justice Clark 
once noted, “we don’t have money at the Court for an army and we can’t take 
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a rare discussion regarding how Chief Justice Burger led the Court in writing the 
opinion, provides unusual insight into how the decision was crafted: not forget the important position—President of the United States—occupied by the respondent. Moreover, twice they emphasize that a court is not “required to 
proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual” (United States v. 
Nixon 708, 715). In doing so the Court remembers and reaffirms that the presi-
dent has important constitutional duties to perform. The Court protects the 
presidency by leaving the president a large sphere of privileged communication 
in protecting “military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets” (706), 
calling such communication “presumptively privileged” (713). 
[When] the Court gathered for its conference on July 9th, the day after oral 
argument had been presented, the Chief Justice urged his colleagues to try to 
reach a unanimous judgment and to join in a single opinion, a goal to which they 
assented. After a review of where each Justice stood, it became clear that the 
President had no support among the eight Justices for his position as to execu-
tive privilege. However, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun—the so-
called Minnesota twins—were troubled about the issue of justiciability, that is, 
whether the Special Prosecutor had the standing to bring this suit to enforce a 
subpoena against his formal superior, the President of the United States. Justice 
Stewart stressed the clear autonomy that the Special Prosecutor had been given 
when this office was created by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and 
the discussions brought Burger and Blackmun around to that view. Four of the 
Court’s liberals—Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart—favored drafting a 
broad opinion limiting the concept of executive privilege, while White and Pow-
ell favored the writing of a narrow opinion that would leave the Court flexibility 
on the issue. After about six hours of discussion, the Justices agreed on the main 
lines of a decision, and Chief Justice Burger assigned to himself the drafting of 
this opinion. The other Justices contributed memoranda for his use, and one ac-
count states that it was Justice Stewart who contributed the draft of the opinion’s 
treatment of the justiciability issue. (Westin xv-xvi) 
The second audience that received consideration from the Court was the 
American public. Given the degree of public sentiment against the President and 
concern over Nixon’s role in Watergate and the cover-up that followed, the Jus-
tices had to reassure the American public that no one, not even the president, 
could evade the “due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the 
courts” (United States v. Nixon 712). One way the Court did this was by reas-
suring the public of the stability of constitutional values and judicial doctrine.  
The Court located language from previous cases indicating that while the 
presidency provides certain benefits during legal controversies, such as immedi-
ate review and avoidance of procedural mechanisms in the appeals process 
(United States v. Nixon 691), the Court also must “look behind names that sym-
bolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is pre-
sented” (693). While recognizing the special position of the president, the Court 
also reassured the public by drawing from Burr and reiterating that their rulings 
“cannot be read to mean in any sense that a President is above the law” (715).  Thus despite apparent differences on the Court, the justices realized the im-portance of unanimity and worked for a single opinion. In this regard the deci-
sion is an exemplar of judicial craftsmanship, reminiscent of Brown v. Board of 
Education, and, unfortunately, is in marked contrast to how the Court has re-
solved many other important issues. The ability of the Court to reach a unani-
mous decision is even more noteworthy considering that this was a Court that 
did not often agree. The day after the profound unanimous decision in Nixon, 
the Court issued a fractured 5-4 decision, split along ideological lines, in a case 
regarding a Detroit statute encouraging busing for better racial integration 
(Westin xv). The unanimous decision put the greatest weight of judicial author-
ity behind the Court’s ruling, earning public support and applying the greatest 
pressure on the President to comply with such a “definitive ruling” (Westin xv). 
The Court’s concern for both the president and the public is further seen in 
the way that the Court balanced the concerns and rights of each against the 
other. The opinion, which also has been described as having a back-and-forth 
tennis match like quality, first sides with privilege then sides with the issuance 
of a subpoena as it seeks to persuade both important audiences of the wisdom of 
its opinion (Kurland 66). For instance, while reassuring the public that no man is 
above the law by looking “behind names that symbolize the parties”(United 
States v. Nixon 693), the Court also defers to Nixon and the presidency when 
drawing from United States v. Burr and twice saying that “We agree with Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s observation, therefore, that ‘in no case of this kind 
would a court be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary 
individual’” (708). This back and forth reasoning is observed at other points in 
the opinion including the previously discussed examination of the validity of the 
issuance of a subpoena under Federal Rule 17 (c). While this style of writing 
may initially seem confusing, it provided a strategic and necessary balance in 
protecting the presidency’s power and Nixon’s dignity while also serving the 
public’s interests. 
A final important audience, lower and future courts, was less well served by 
the opinion. Since these courts look to the nation’s highest Court for guidance 
when faced with similar circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Court to at-
tempt to set out clear, concise approaches to the central issues of each contro-
versy. In this instance, the definition of executive privilege leaves other courts a 
mixed bag of language with which to deal. 
In the opinion, consistent with previous decisions that defer to presidential 
responsibilities in military and diplomatic matters (Fisher 215-16), the justices 
reaffirmed that even more privileged than executive privilege and executive con-
fidentiality is the President’s “need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive 
national security secrets.” While this afforded consistency and provided a touch-
stone for future and lower courts, there is ambiguity in the language governing 
The nine justices and their efforts to arrive at a unanimous opinion com-
posed a third crucial audience in the controversy. Since it is believed that Nixon 
was considering disobeying the order if the decision was close (Nelson 197), it 
was important that Chief Justice Burger and seven of his colleagues worked to 
unite behind a single, unanimous opinion.3 While the decision making process 
of the justices is not precisely known, a combination of journalistic sources and 
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potential constraints. The Court asserted its “authority to interpret claims with 
respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers” (United States v. 
Nixon 704). Furthermore, through appeal to Baker v. Carr, the Court empha-
sized that the “delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation” to be undertaken 
in determining breaches by the executive branch “is a responsibility of the Court 
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution” (United States v. Nixon 704). By 
making the executive branch accountable, they not only held their powers under 
Article III but they also increased their realm of jurisdiction. If an analogy were 
to be made, United States v. Nixon may be to the Court’s scope regarding ex-
ecutive review and oversight what Marbury v. Madison is to the Court’s ability 
of judicial review generally—or perhaps more ominously as Scott v. Sandford is 
to legislative review. 
privilege. For instance on at least nine occasions the Court spoke of the rela-
tively ambiguous “confidentiality of presidential communications” (United 
States v. Nixon various wordings on 697, 703, 705, 706, 708, 710, 711, 713, 
714), using terms general enough to suggest a constitutional privilege of broader 
dimensions than the limited evidentiary privilege with which it was actually 
concerned. The Court might have clarified the scope of the protection had it 
exclusively applied executive privilege to matters which “protect military, dip-
lomatic, or sensitive national security secrets” (Kurland 35).  
Yet perhaps more important than the murky definition of privilege itself is 
the responsibility lower courts inherited due to the ambiguities in the language. 
Subsequent to United States v. Nixon, the federal courts have had the role of 
arbitrating both the general definitions and the document-by-document review 
of those “presidential communications” that may become central to criminal 
proceedings (Westin xxi). The potential difficulties stemming from the ambigu-
ously broad “confidentiality of presidential communications” is demonstrated in 
later controversies involving President Clinton (Clinton v. Jones). Does confi-
dentiality extend to discussions with presidential spouses, friends, or writings in 
personal journals? The exact types of confidential communication and its limits 
are relatively vague,4 leaving future and lower courts to resolve difficult ques-
tions. Had the Court initially been more precise in defining “presidential com-
munications,” they may have guided subordinate courts more constructively. 
Second, in resolving a central exigence, the Court took the issue of execu-
tive privilege and set out parameters for what is and is not protected under the 
enumerated powers. The fact that the Court determined the scope of privilege is 
a lasting effect in that they control its definition and may read the concept as 
they see fit. While placing a restriction on the Executive Branch, the Court did 
defer in part to the presidency by recognizing a president’s right to withhold 
certain information, a first in the history of the Court (Lamb and Halpern 139). 
The longer term impact of the Court’s method of handling the Nixon exigence is 
seen when the Court later exercised its power to review presidential action in 
Clinton v. Jones and there noted “it is settled that the judiciary may severely 
burden the executive branch by reviewing the legality of the president’s con-
duct” (682). Later in that opinion, the Court again called upon United States v. 
Nixon to support their argument that Clinton was responsible to answer to the 
Court (Clinton v. Jones 705, 715, 718). 
Within United States v. Nixon we can see efforts to address four distinct 
audiences. Because of audiences capacity as the mediators of change (Bitzer 
253), they must be satisfied that they have been addressed by the rhetor in a 
suitable manner. In satisfying each constituency the Court told Nixon that he 
had privilege in protecting “military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security 
secrets” (United States v. Nixon 706), but, to reassure the public, the Court re-
minded them that they have “a right to every man’s evidence” (709). The opin-
ion’s language was tailored to the interests of each important group, eliciting 
from them a willingness to mediate the change and resolve the exigence. 
Lastly, while the ramifications to this point have been either political or le-
gal, one must realize how “the people” came out in this decision. This decision 
reaffirmed the American principle that no one is above the law and that the 
American judicial system must be allowed to operate. The Court recognized this 
when they wrote that “the impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege 
would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the judicial branch 
to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of 
the courts under Article III” (United States v. Nixon 707). The American judi-
cial system is based upon the principle that all men are equal before the law. 
This decision carries that maxim to the highest level by saying that even in the 
most extreme and unique cases the law continues to function according to prin-
ciple. Perhaps most importantly to the Court, the public accepted this decision. 
In a poll taken in 1974, sixty-five percent of the public felt that Nixon’s actions 
were serious enough to force resignation (Newport 3). 
Conclusion: The Legacy of United States v. Nixon 
Both the short and long term effects of United States v. Nixon make it 
among the most influential cases decided by the Supreme Court. In the short-
term it was the immediate cause of the resignation of the President of the United 
States (Freidman ix) and it was the first time that the Court had recognized a 
constitutional basis for executive privilege (Biskupic and Witt 219). The long-
range effects of the case are also significant. These effects include (1) the 
Court’s augmentation of its own power, (2) an attempt to set parameters for ex-
ecutive privilege under the enumerated powers, and (3) a reaffirmation of the 
American judicial system. To conclude this essay, a brief consideration of each 
is necessary as well as some final reflection on the utility of the rhetorical situa-
tion as an approach to judicial rhetoric. 
By using Bitzer’s formulation of the rhetorical situation to analyze United 
States v. Nixon we have examined the rhetorical situation’s potential application 
as an approach to judicial rhetoric. While not a theory with contemporary popu-
larity, examining the rhetorical situation of a judicial controversy holds the po-
tential to provide additional understanding of the Court’s decision making. By 
allowing for the viewing of multiple axes simultaneously, the rhetorical situation 
First and perhaps most importantly, the Court augmented its own power by 
reaffirming its right to review other branches of government. The expansion in 
power is signaled in the per curiam opinion through the Court’s treatment of 
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 Bitzer, Lloyd. “The Rhetorical Situation.” Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition. Ed. 
Walter R.  puts a premium on the interaction of features. It is at once simple and nuanced in demanding attention to competing factors. The “categories” of constraints, exi-
gence, and audience are not clean or neatly divisible—nor should they be—the 
fluid nature of the elements demonstrates the utility of the scheme and under-
scores that the approach is more than a mechanism for dry, pre-critical categori-
zation. Bitzer wrote that “rhetorical discourse . . . obtain[s] its character-as-
rhetorical from the situation which generates it” (249). And in this circumstance 
had the Court acted unaware of the constraints laid before them or the wants and 
needs of the various audiences and presented a discourse that was not “fitting” 
they would have surely failed, risking their institutional power and the shape of 
American democracy. As it was, however, the Court was effective at negotiating 
the constraints, resolving the exigencies, and placating the important audiences. 
Speaking in one voice, the Court reaffirmed its institutional authority and reas-
sured and protected the public in upholding the principle that no man, not even 
the president, is above the law. 
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